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Office of the Secretary of State 
March Fong Eu 
1230 J Street 
Sacramento, Californill 95814 
February 29, 1984 





Lewis K. Uhler, the proponent of the BALANCED FEDERAL 
BUDGET INITIATIVE, has filed more than the required number 
of 393,835 signatures with the counties. 
Therefore, pursuant to Elections Code section 3520(d), 
you must verify 500 signatures or five percent of the number 
of signatures filed, whichever is the greater number. Enclosed 
is a set of random numbers generated for your county. The 
use of these sheets will ensure that you verify the correct 
number of signatures. 
You have 15 days from the date you receive this 
notification to finish your verification. Please certify the 
count of the number of valid signatures on the enclosed 
certificate, and attach a blank copy of the petition section 
to the certificate. 




Office of the Secretary of State 
March Fong Eu 
1230 J Street 
Sacramento, California 95814 
February 29, 1984 




Lewis K. Uhler, the proponent of the BALANCED FEDERAL 
BUDGET INITIATIVE, has filed more than the required number 
of 393,835 signatures with the counties. 
Therefore, pursuant to Elections Code section 3520(d), 
you must verify all the signatures filed with you and certify 
the count of the number of valid signatures. 
You have 15 days from the date you receive this 
notification to finish your verification. Please certify 
the count of valid signatures on the enclosed certificate, 
and attach a blank copy of the petition section to the 
certificate. 




Office of the Secretary of State 
March Fong Eu 
1230 J Street 
Sacramento, California 95814 
February 29, 1984 
Elections Division 
(916) 445-0820 
TO: REGISTRARS OF VOTERS for the counties of Los Angeles 
and San Diego 
FROM: 
BARBARA J. LE 
ELECTIONS TEC 
Lewis K. Uhler, the proponent of the BALANCED FEDERAL 
BUDGET, has filed more than 393,835 signatures with the 
counties. 
Therefore, pursuant to Elections Code section 3520(d), 
you must verify five percent of the number of signatures 
filed. 
You have 15 days from February 29, 1984, the date you 
were notified by phone, to finish your verification. Please 
certify the count of the number of valid signatures on the 
enclosed certificate, and attach a blank copy of the petition 
section to the certificate. 
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Office of the Secretary of State 
March Fong Eu 
1230 J Street 
Sacramento, Californil1 95814 
Elections Division 
(916) 445-0820 
September 23, 1983 
TO ALL REGISTRARS OF VOTERS, OR COUNTY CLERKS, AND PROPONENT 
Pursuant to Section 3513 of the Elections Code, we transmit herewith a copy 
of the Title and Summary prepared by the Attorney General on a proposed 
Initiative Measure entitled: 
BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET. 
INITIA TIVE STATUTE. 
Circulating and Filing Schedule 
1. Minimum number of Signatures required •••••••••••••.••••••• 393,835 
Cal. Const., Art. II, Sec. 8(b). 
2. Official Summary Date .•.••..•.•..•••.•...•...•••.• Friday, 9/23/83 
Elec. C., Sec. 3513. 
3. Petition Sections: 
a. First day Proponent can circulate Sections for signatures •• Friday, 9/23/83 
Elec. C., Sec. 3513. 
b. Last day Proponent can circulate and file with the county. 
All Sections are to be filed at the same time within each 
county ....................................... Tuesday, 2/21/84+* 
Elec. C., Sees. 3513, 3520(a). 
c. Last day for county to determine total number of signatures 
affixed to petition and to transmit total to the Secretary of 
State ........................................ Tuesday, 2/28/84 
(If the Proponent files the petition with the county on a date prior to 2/21/84, 
the county has five working days from the filing of the petition to determine 
the total number of Signatures affixed to the petition and to transmit the 
total to the Secretary of State.) Elec. C., Sec. 3520(b). 
* Date adjusted for official deadline which falls on a holiday. Elec. C., Sec. 
60. 
+ PLEASE NOTE: To the Proponent who may wish to qualify for the 1984 
Primary Election. The law allows up to approximately 58 days to county 
election officials for checking and reporting petition signatures and trans-
mitting results. The law also requires that this process be completed 131 
days before the election in which the people will vote on the initiative. 
It is possible that the county may not need precisely 58 days. But if you 
want to be sure that this initiative qualifies for the 1984 Primary Election, 
you should file this petition with the county before November 29, 1983. 
BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET. 
September 23, 1983 
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d. Secretary of State determines whether the total 
number of signatures filed with all county clerks 
meets the minimum number of required signatures, 
and notifies the counties ••••••••••.•••••••••••••• Thursday, 3/1/84** 
e. Last day for county to determine total number of 
qualified voters who signed the petition, and to 
transmit certificate with a blank copy of the 
petition to the Secretary of State ••••••.••••.•••••• Friday, 3/16/84 
(If the Secretary of State notifies the county to 
determine the number of qualified voters who 
signed the petition on a date other than 2/28/84, 
the last day is not later than the fifteenth day 
after county's receipt of notification.) 
Elec. C., Sec. 3520(d), (e). 
f. If the signature count is more than 433,218 or 
less than 354,452, then the Secretary of State 
certifies the petition has qualified or failed, 
and notifies the counties. If the signature count 
is between 354,452 and 433,218 inclusive, then 
the Secretary of State notifies the counties 
using the random sampling technique to deter-
mine the validity of all signatures ••••••.••••••••••• Sunday, 3/18/84** 
g. Last day for county to determine actual number 
of all qualified voters who signed the petition, 
and to transmit certificate with a blank copy of 
the petition to the Secretary of State ••••••••••••••• Tuesday, 4/17/84 
(If the Secretary of State notifies the county to 
determine the number of qualified voters who 
have signed the petition on a date other than 
3/16/84, the last day is not later than the 
thirtieth day after county's receipt of 
notification.) 
Elec. C., Sec. 3521(b), (c). 
h. Secretary of State certifies whether the petition 
has been signed by the number of qualified voters 
required to declare the petition sufficient •••.••.•...• Thursday, 4/19/84** 
**Date varies based on receipt of county certification. 
JOliN K. VAN DE KAMP 
Attorney General 
September 23, 1983 
Honorable March Fong Eu 
Secretary of State 
1230 J Street 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Dear Mrs. Eu: 
Re: Initiative Title and Summary. 
Our File No. SA83RF0020 
State of Califomia 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 




III .. alike of .... Secr.t.ry of ..... 
.. at. Sta .. of Califer"ra 
SEP 23 1983 
Pursuant to the provisions of section 3503 and 3513 of the 
Elections code, you are hereby notified that on this day we 
mailed to the proponent(s) of the above identified proposed 
initiative our title and summary. 
Enclosed is a copy of our transmittal letter to the 
proponent(s), a copy of our title and summary, a declaration 
of mailing thereof, and a copy of the proposed measure. 
According to information available in our records, the 
name(s) and address(es) of the proponent(s) is as stated on 
the declaration of mailing. 
Very truly yours, 




\......... ~~. - '--
/Robert Burton 




Date: September 23, 1983 
File No.: SA83RF0020 
The Attorney General of California has prepared the 
following title and summary of the chief purpose and points 
of the proposed measure: 
BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET. INITIATIVE STATUTE. Mandates that 
California Legislature adopt a specified resolution urging 
Congress to submit to the several states for ratification 
a United States Constitution amendment to require a balanced 
federal budget, with certain exceptions, or, in the alternative, 
to call a constitutional convention for sole purpose of 
proposing this amendment. If Legislature does not adopt 
this resolution within time specified, suspends payment of 
legislators' compensation, benefit, and expenses until 
adopted. Further provides that if Legislature fails to 
timely adopt the resolution, the resolution shall be 
transmitted to Congress by Secretary of State. Smrunary of 
estimate by Legislative Analyst and Director of Finance 
of fiscal impact on state and local governments: Adoption 
of this measure, by itself, would not have any direct 
fiscal impact on state or local governments. 
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JOlIN K. Vt\!\' DE Kf\i\JP 
Att(,mey General 
September 23, 1983 
Lewis K. Uhler 
7330 Morningside Drive 
Loomis, California 95650 
Re: Initiative Title and Summary. 
Subject: Balanced Federal Budget 
Our File No. SA83RF0020 
State a/California 
l>El'r\Rl'MENT OF JUST/Cf: 
151S ..: STHEET, Sl'lTE SI I 
SACH;\\IENTO 95S1-l 
(916) -l-lS-95.'J5 
Pursuant to your request, we have prepared the attached 
title and summary of the chief purposes and points of the 
above identified proposed initiative. A copy of our letter 
to the Secretary of State, as required by Elections Code 
sections 3503 and 3513, our declaration of mailing, and the 
text of your proposal that was considered is attached. 
The Secretary of State will be sending your shortly a copy 
of the circulating and filing schedule for your proposal 
that will be issued by that office. 
Please send us a copy of the petition after you have it 
printed. This copy is not for our review or approval, but 
to supplement our file in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
JOHN K. VAN DE KAHP 
Attorney General 
Robert Burton 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attachment 
(RF-9, 6/83) 
DECLARATION OF MAILING 
The undersigned Declarant, states as follows: 
I am over the age of 18 years and not a proponent 
of the within matter; my place of employment and business 
address is 1515 K Street, Suite 511, Sacramento, California 
95814. 
On the date shown below, I mailed a copy or copies 
of the attached letter to the proponents, by placing a true 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to the proponents 
named below at the addresses indicated, and by sealing and 
depositing said envelope or envelopes in the United States 
mail at Sacramento, California, with postage prepaid. There 
is delivery service by United States mail at each of the 
places so addressed, or there is regular communication by 
mail between the place of mailing and each of the places so 
addressed. 
Date of Mailing: 
Subject: 
Our File No.: 
September 23, 1983 
Balanced Federal Budget 
SA83RF0020 
Name of Proponent(s) and Address(es): 
LEWIS K. UHLER 
7330 Morningside Drive 
Loomis, California 95650 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the 
foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed at Sacramento, California on September 23, 
1983. 
(RF-l0a, 1/83) 
MARSHA L. BIERER 
Declarant 
Office of the Secretary of State 
March Fong Eu 
Mr. Lewis K. Uhler 
7330 Morningside Drive 
Loomis, CA. 95650 
Dear Mr. Uhler: 
( 
1230 J Street 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Narch 21, 1984 
Elections Division 
(916) 445-0820 
Pursuant to Section 3523 of the Elections Code~ I hereby 
certify that on March 21, 1984 the certificates received 
from the County Clerks or Registrars of Voters by the 
Secretary of State established that the initiative BALANCED 
FEDERAL BUDGET. INITIATIVE STATuTE~ has been signed by the 
requisite number of qualified electors needed to declare the 
petition sufficient. The BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET. INITIATIVE 








Office of the Secretary of State 1230 J Street 
March Fong Eu Sacramento, California 95814 
Mr. Darryl White 
Secretary or' the Senate 
State Capitol, Room 3045 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Mr. White: 
March 21, 1984 
Elections Division 
(916) 445-0820 
Pursuant to Section 3523.1 of the Elections Code as 
added by SB 1412 (Chapter 642, Statutes of 1980), I 
am hereby transmitting to you two (2) copies of the 
initiative entitled: BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET. This 




Office of the Secretary of State 
March Fong Eu 
1230 J Street 
Sacramento, California 95814 
March 21, 1984 
TO ALL COUNTY CLERKS/REGISTRARS OF VOTERS 
Elections Division 
(916) 445-0820 
Pursuant to Section 3523 of the Elections Code, I hereby 
certify that on March 21, 1984 the certificates received from 
the County Clerks or Registrars of Voters by the Secretary of 
State established that the Initiative Statute, BALANCED FEDERAL 
BUDGET, has been signed by the requisite number of qualified 
electors needed to declare the petition sufficient. THE BALANCED 
FEDERAL BUDGET. INITIATIVE STATUTE is, therefore, qualified for 
the November 6, 1984 General Election. 
BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET. INITIATIVE STATUTE. 
Mandates that California Legislature adopt a 
specified resolution urging Congress to submit 
to the several states for ratification a United 
States Constitution amendment to require a bal-
anced federal budget, with certain exceptions, 
or, in the alternative, to call a constitutional 
convention for sole purpose of proposing this 
amendment. If Legislature does not adopt this 
resolution within time specified, suspends pay-
ment of legislators' compensation, benefit, and 
expenses until adopted. Further provides that 
if Legislature fails to timely adopt the resolu-
tion, the resolution shall be transmitted to 
Congress by Secretary of State. Summary of estim-
ate by Legislative Analyst and Director of Finance 
of fiscal impact on state and local governments: 
Adoption of this measure, by itself, would not 
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Sacramento, California 95814 
JAMES D. DRISCOLL 
CHIEF CLERK 
Anthony L. Miller 
Chief Deputy Secretary 
of State 
Office of the Secretary 
of State 
Executive Office 
1230 J Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Mr. Miller: 
May 14, 1984 
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter, 
dated April 27, 1984, transmitting copies of 
initiative entitled "Balanced Federal Budget" 
(Pursuant to Section 3523.1, Elections Code) • 
Your communication has been presented to the 
Assembly and referred to the Committee on Elections, 
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments 
(See Assembly Journal for May 7, 1984, Page 14370). 
Sincerely, 
JDD:pc 
For Immediate Release 
September 23, 1983 
Contact: Caren Daniels 
BALANCED FEDERAL BUDGET INITIATIVE BEGINS, REPORTS EU 
SACRAMENTO -- The director of the Loomis-based National Tax 
Limitation Committee has once again launched an initiative drive to 
amend the U.S. Constitution to require a balanced federal budget, 
Secretary of State March Fong Eu announced today (Sept. 23). 
:; :. \ ~;.... ..; 
... ~ .:l ~ .. -t;\ 
Lewis K. Uhler must collect 393,835 signatures of registered voters 
to qualify his "Balanced Federal Budget" initiative statute for the 
ballot and submit them to county elections officials by Feb. 2, 1984, 
the legal 1S0-day deadline. However, should he wish to qualify the 
measure for the June 1984 primary election ballot, all signatures must 
be submitted by Nov. 29 to allow sufficient time for full signature 
verification. Mr. Uhler can be reached at (916) 652-0471. 
The measure would mandate the California Legislature to adopt and 
transmit to the U.s. Congress a resolution asking the Congress "pro-
pose and submit to the several states an amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States to require, with certain exceptions, that the 
federal budget be balanced .•. " or to call a constitutional convention 
for the sole purpose of proposing this amendment. If the Legislature 
failed to adopt the resolution within the specified time, all compen-
sation, benefit and expenses for legislators would be suspended until 
the resolution was adopted. Further, if the resolution were not adopted 
by the Legislature, it would be transmitted to Congress by the Secretary 
of State. 
A similar measure, proposed by Mr. Uhler in April of this year, 
failed to qualify for the ballot. 
A copy of the initiative, its title and summary, and circulation 
calendar is attached. 
U# 
8345MW ... .-.. ~ ... '. 
,-.-:It,~ j 
I " , ' 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR-CONGRESS ) 






MARCH FONG EU, as Secretary of ) 




LEWIS K. UHLER, ) 
) 




This is an original petition for writ of mandate 
to order respondent Eu, the ~ecretary of State of the 
state of California, to refrain from taking any action, 
including the expenditure of public funds, to place the 
proposed Balanced Federal Budget statutory Initiative on 
the November 1984 ballot.ll The principal effect of the 
proposed initiative would be to compel the California 
11 The other respondents are.Carl Olsen, San 
Francisco City Clerk, and Jay Patterson, San Francisco 
Registrar of voters. Patterson has filed a disclaimer 
indicating that he does not intend to defend the suit. 
1 
SEE CONCURRING AN~_nISSENTING:OPINIONS 
i r 
Legislatu!e, on penalty of loss of salary, to apply to . 
Congress to convene a constitutional convention for the 
limited and singular purpose of proposing an amendment to 
the United States Constitution requiring a balanced federal 
budget. If the Legislature fails to act, the Secretary of 
State is directed to apply directly to Congress on behalf of 
the people of the State of California. 
The fifth Article to the United States Constitution 
sets out two alternative methods of proposing constitutional 
am~ndments.~1 It provides in relevant part, that "[t]he 
Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to thIs Constitution, 
or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of 
the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all 
Intents:and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when 
ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several 
States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the 
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by 
Congress • "31 . . --
11 for a discussion of the drafting of article 
V, see Dillinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" 
Constitutional Convention (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 1623, 1624-
1630. 
21 The remaining language in article V prohibited 
any amendment barring importation of slaves before 1808, and 
any amendment depriving a state of equal representation 1n 
the senate without its consent. 
2 
In the two centuries since the Constitution was 
promulgated, it has been amended only twenty-six times. 
Each of those amendments was proposed by the Congress. (All 
but one were ratified by state legislatures; the Twenty-
first Amendment was ratified by state conventions.) Al-
though there have been many efforts to call a constitutional 
convention to propose amendments, all have failed to secure 
applications by the legislatures of the necessary two-thirds 
of the states.!/ 
In recent years a number of persons, including the 
current President, have urged the enactment of a constitu~ 
tional amendment reQuiring a balanced federal budget. 
Numerous bills have been introduced 1n Congress. Although 
the Senate on one occasion approved a proposed constitu-
tional amendment by the necessary two-thirds vote, the 
measure ~ailed in the House of Representatives; thus the 
proposed amendment has never been submitted to the states 
for ratification. 
In the meantime, proponents of the amendment 
attempted to avoid the necessity for congressional approval 
by resorting to the alternative method of proposing constitu-
tional amendments -- a convention called upon application of 
!I See Brinkfield, Problems Relating to a Federal 
Constitutional Convention (l957) (Com. printing, House Judi-
ciary Com., 85th Cong., 1st Sess.) The call for a convention 
to propose the direct election of senators came within one 
state of success, and may have induced Congress to submit 
the Seventeenth Amendment to the states for ratification. 
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two-thirds of the states. As of this writing the legisla-
tures in 32 of the necessary 34 states have formally applied 
to the Congress to call such a convention.11 
following this strategy, proponents have regularly 
introduced resolutions in the California Legislature calling 
for a convention to propose a balanced budget amendment. 
The Legislature has held hearings on some of these measures, 
but it has declined to adopt any resolution calling for a 
federal constitutional convention. The supporters of the 
balanced budget amendment now seek to compel action by the 
California Legislature by popular initiative.~/ 
The proposed initiative reads as follows: 
"INITIATIVE MEASURE TO BE SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THE 
VOTERS. Section One. (a) The People of the state of 
California hereby mandate that the California Legislature 
adopt the following resolution and submit the same to the 
Congress of the United States under the provisions of 
Article V of the Constitution of the United states: 
"That the Congress of the United States is urged to 
propose and submit to the several states an amendment to the 
11 The applications from the several states 
differ as to the exact content of the proposed amendment and 
the responsibilities of the proposed convention. It is not 
clear whether there are currently 32 valid applications 
pending for a constitutional convention. 
!' Similar initiatives are pending in at least 
two other states, Montana and Washington. 
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Constitution of the United States to require, with certain 
exceptions, that the federal budget be balanced; and 
"That application is hereby made to the Congress of 
the United states, pursuant to Article V of the Constitution 
of the United states, to call a convention for the sole 
purpose of proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States to require, with certain exceptions, that the 
federal budget be balanced; and 
"If the Congress of the United states proposes an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States identical 
in subject matter to that contained herein and submits same 
to the States for ratification, this application shall no 
longer be of any force and effect; and 
"This applfcation shall be deemed null and void, 
rescinded and of no effect in the event that such convention 
not be ~imlted to such specific and exclusive purposes; and 
"This application constitutes a continuing applica-
tion in ~ccordance with Article V of the Constitution of the 
United States until at least two-thirds of the several States 
have made similar applications pursuant to Article V of the 
United States Constitution; 
Web) The Secretary of the Senate is hereby 
directed to transmit copies of this application, upon its 
adoption by the California Legislature, to the President and 
Secretary of the United states Senate and the Speaker and 
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Clerk of the House of Representatives of the Congress Of the 
United States. 
"Section Two. The following is added to sections 
8901 through 8903 and section 9320 of the Government Code 
and shall modify, amend or control any other laws or regu-
lations of the State of California similar in subject matter, 
heretofore or hereinafter enacted: 
ft. •• If the California Legislature fails to 
adopt the resolution set forth in Section One of [this] 
initiative measure and submit same to the Congress of the 
United states, as required therein, on or before the end .of 
the twentieth (20th) legislative day after approval by the 
people of the.said initiative measure, or if the legis-
lature adjourns or recesses during the regular session prior 
to the twentieth (20th) legislative day without adopting said 
resolutton, or having adopted same, repeals, rescinds, nulli-
fies or contradicts said resolution, all payments, compensa-
tion, benefits, expenses, perquisites and any other payments 
to any member of the California Legislature made pursuant to 
this Section shall be suspended as to each and every legis-
lator until such time as the California Legislature adopts 
such resolution. . . . 
"Section Three. (a) The people of the State of 
California hereby adopt the resolution set forth in Section 
One of this initiative measure; and (b) If the California 
6 
Legislature fails to adopt the resolution set forth in 
"" 
Section One of this initiative measure within forty (40) 
legislative days of the approval of this initiative measure, 
the Secretary of State of California shall transmit the 
resolution adopted pursuant to this Section to the President 
and Secretary of the United States Senate and the Speaker 
and Clerk of the House of Representatives of the Congress of 
the United States. 
"Section Four. [Limits legislative amendment of 
the initiative.] 
"Section Five. If any section or subsection of 
this initiative or the aforementioned resolution shall be 
held invalid, the remainder of the initative and the afore-
mentioned resoluti9n, to the extent they can be given effect, 
or the application of such provision to persons or circum-
stances_other than those as to which it is held invalid, 
shall not be affected thereby, and to this end the provisions 
of this chapter are severable." 
On March 18, 1984, respondent Secretary of State 
certified that the proposed initiative had received suffi-
cient signatures to appear on the November 1984 ballot. 
Petitioners, organizations and individual California tax-
payers opposed to the initiative,ll filed an original 
21 Petitioners are: American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations; American Asso-
ciation of University Women, California State Division; 
(fn. continued) 
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action in this court for writ of mandamus. We scheduled a 
special calendar to consider the matter before the ballots 
were printed for the forthcoming election. 
We have concluded that the initiative, to the 
extent that it applies for a constitutional convention or 
requires the Legislature to do so, does not conform to 
article V of the United States Constitution. Article V 
provides for applications by the "Legislatures of two-thirds 
of the several States," not by the people through the ini-
tiative; it envisions legislators free to vote their best 
judgment, responsible to their constituents through the 
electoral process, not puppet legislators coerced or com-
pelled by loss of salary or otherwise to vote in favor of a 
proposal they may believe unwise. 
We also conclude that the measure exceeds the scope 
of the initiative power under the controlling provisions of " 
(fn. 7 continued) 
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California; ACLU 
Foundation of Southern California; American Federation of 
state, County and Municipal Employees; American Jewish 
Committee; Americans United for Separation of" Church and 
state; B'nai B'rith International; General Board of Church 
and Society, United Methodist Church; National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc.; National 
Conference of Catholic Charities; National Council of La 
Raza; National Council of Senior Citizens; National Farmers 
Union; National Organization for Women; Office for Church in 
Society, United Church of Christ; Service Employees Inter-
national Union; Edward J. Collins; Virginia Diogo; Rabbi 
Allen I. Freehling; and Timothy J. Twomey. 
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the Califqrnia Constitution (art. II, § S and art. IV, § 1). 
The initiative power is the power to adopt nstatutesn~/ __ 
to enact laws -- but the crucial provisions of the balanced 
budget initiative do not adQpt a statute or enact a law. 
They adopt, and mandate the Legislature to adopt, a resolu-
~ which does not change California law and constitutes 
only one step in a process which might eventually amend the 
federal Constitution. Such a resolution is not an exercise 
of legislative power reserved to the people under the 
California Constitution. 
Real party in interest argues that we sh6uld nl~t 
the people's voice be heard." Even if the initiative is 
invalid, he implies, the election will give the voters the 
opportunity to express their views on the desirability of a 
balanced budget, and the legislators may respond to the 
outcome ~f the election. This argument misunderstands the 
purpose of the initiative in California. It is not a public 
opinion poll. It is a method of enacting legislation, and 
1f the proposed measure does not enact legislation, or if it 
seeks to compel legislative action which the electorate has 
no power to compel, it should not be on the ballot. 
11 The initiative also includes the power to 
amend the state Constitution. The balanced budget initia-
tive, however, was denominated as an "initiative statute," 
which requires the signatures of 5 percent of the registered 
voters. (Cal. Canst., art. II, §S.) An initiative which 
amends the state Constitution requires the signatures of 8 
percent of the voters. (1&.) 
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We do not suggest that the voters of Californfa are 
without a remedy. This is an election year, in which all 
members of the Assembly and one-half of the state senators 
are to be chosen. Voters for and voters against the 
balanced budget proposal have ample opportunity to make 
their views known to candidates for legislative seats, and 
the legislators will be able to act on those expressed views 
in future sessions. 
I. Propriety of Preelection Review 
One year ago we considered whether to issue a writ 
of mandamus to enjoin a special election called by the 
Governor to vote upon a proposed initiative measure redis-
tricting the state Legislature. (Legislature of the state 
of California v. Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658.) Opponents 
of the initiative .contended that redistricting could occur 
only on~e within the decade following a federal census, and 
thus that the initiative, which proposed a second redis-
tricting within the same IO-year period, exceeded the legis-
lative power reserved by the people. We agreed, and issued 
mandamus to bar the election. 
Our opinion first discussed the propriety of pre-
election review. We began by reciting the general rule that 
·'It is usually more appropriate to review constitutional 
and other challenges to ballot propositions or initiative 
measures after an election rather than to disrupt the 
10 
, . 
electoral process by preventing the exercise of the peo~le's 
franchise, in the absence of some clear showing of invalid-
ity. [Citations.]' (Brosnahan v. Eu (1982) 31 Cal.3d 1, 4.) 
That principle is a salutary one, and where appropriate we 
adhere to it." (34 Cal.3d at p. 665.) We then went on, 
however, to note Justice Mosk's separate opinion in 
Brosnahan v. Eu, supra. Justice Mosk had stated that the 
general rule inhibiting preelection review "applies only to 
the contention that an initiative is unconstitutional 
because of its substance. If it is determined that the 
electorate does not have the power to adopt the proposal 1n 
the first instance . • • the measure -must be excluded from 
the ballot." (31 Cal.3~ at p. 6.) He cited examples to 
support this exception: "election officials have been 
ordered not to place initiative and referendum proposals on 
the ballot on the ground that the electorate did not have 
the power to enact them since they were not legislative in 
character [citations], the subject was not a municipal 
affair [citations], or the proposal amounted to a revision 
of the Constitution rather than an amendment thereto 
[citation)." (lB.) 
Our opinion in Legislature of the State of 
California v. Oeukmejian, supra, 34 Cal.3d 658 endorsed the 
standard described by Justice Mosk. "Here," we said, as in 
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those cases cited by Justice Mask, Wthe challenge goes to 
.< 
the power of the electorate to adopt the proposal in the 
first instance •• . . The question raised is, in a sense, 
jurisdictional." (P. 667.) Since the issue raised by the 
Legislature challenged the power of the people to enact a 
second legislative redistricting within a single decade, we 
concluded that preelection review was proper.21 
The present proceeding likewise challenges the 
power of the people to adopt the proposed initiative. The 
petitioners contend that under article V of the United 
States Constitution, the people have no constitutional 
authority to apply to the Congress for a constitutional 
convention, or to mandate their Legislature to submit such 
an applicationd They further contend that the proposed 
initiative is not legislative in character, a well estab-
lished ground for barring an initiative measure from the 
ballot (see Simpson v. Hite, supra, 36 Cal.2d 125, 129-134), 
and that it does not enact a statute as required by article 
!I The exercise of preelection review in Legis-
lature of the State of California v. Oeukmejian, supra, 34 
Cal.3d 658, was not an unprecedented act. Previous deci-
sions had barred elections on a state initiative measure 
(McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Cal.2d 330; Gage v. Jordan 
(1944) 23 Cal.2d 794). Other court decisions have barred 
elections on local initiatives (e.g., Simpson v. Hite (1950) 
36 Cal.2d 125; Meryvnne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558) 
and referenda (e.g., Fishman v. City of Palo Alto (1978) 86 
Cal. App .3d 506). 
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II, section 8 of the state Constitution.!Q1 These conten-
.' 
tions state proper grounds for preelection review of the 
proposed balanced budget initiative.!!! 
Although real party in interest recites the prin-
ciples of popular sovereignty which led to the establishment 
of the initiative and referendum in California, those prin-
ciples do not disclose any value in putting before the people 
a measure which they have no power to enact. The presence 
of an invalid measure on the ballot steals attention, time 
and money from the numerous valid propositions on the same 
lQl We note also the legal and practical problems 
which might arise in postelection review. Section 3 of the 
initiative ~dopts a resolution applying for a constitutional 
convention; it is arguable that this adoption is effective 
immediately (cf. Dillon v. Gloss (1921) 256 U.S. 368, 376) 
and that the validity of that application thereafter is not 
an issue within the purview of the courts (see Coleman v. 
Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 433). The provisions of section 2 
suspending legislative salaries go into effect 20 legisla-
tive days after the election. It would be possible for 
petitioners to file a petition for mandate and seek a stay 
within this period. But one usual argument for postelection 
review -- that the court will have more time to consider the 
issues and decide the.case -- loses some force when the court 
will have to act on an application for provisional relief 
within a very limited time period following the election. 
111 Language in some cases suggests that even if 
a proposed measure is within the scope of the initiative 
power, courts retain eQuitable discretion to examine the 
measure before the election upon a compelling showing that 
the substantive provisions of the initiative are clearly 
invalid. (See Harnett v. County of Sacramento (1925) 195 
Cal. 676, 683; Gayle v. Hamm (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 250, 255; 
Note, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in Cali-
fornia (1966) 54 Cal. L.Rev. 1717, 1725-1729.) We dId not 
base our decision to hear the present case before the elec-
tion upon that doctrine, but instead relied upon the prin-
ciple that allegations charging that a measure exceeds the 
initiative power are properly justiciable before election. 
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ballot. It will confuse some voters and frustrate others, 
and an ultimate decision that the measure is invalid, coming 
after the voters have voted in favor of the measure, tends 
to denigrate the legitimate use of the initiative procedure. 
II. Issues Arising Under Article V of the United 
States ConstitutIon 
Our discussion of the federal constitutional issues 
proceeds in three steps. First, we inQuire whether the term 
"Legislatures" as used in article V refers to the representa-
tive body elected to enact the laws of the state -- in 
California, the state Senate and Assembly -- or to the whole 
-
of the state legislative power, including the reserved power 
of initiative. Our conclusion that it refers only to the 
representative body makes it clear that the people cannot by 
initiative apply directly to Congress for a constitutional 
convention. We then turn to two remaining Questions: 
whether the people by initiative can (a) compel the 
Legislature to apply to Congress for a constitutional 
convention or (b) urge Congress to submit a proposed 
amendment to the states. 
We must first, however, address briefly the 
contention raised by distinguished amicus curiae (former 
Attorney General Griffin Bell, former Senator Sam Ervin, and 
Professor John Noonan) that none of the federal constitu-
tional issues raised here are justiciable. They cite 
14 
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Coleman v. Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 433, in which the court 
refused to adjudicate the validity of Kansas' ratification 
of the proposed Child Labor Amendment. The Coleman peti-
tioners first challenged the authority of the lieutenant 
governDr to break a tie vote on ratification; the court 
divided equally on the justiciability of that issue. They 
next asserted that having once rejected the amendment, 
Kansas could not later ratify; the court, relying on the 
historical precedent of the 'Fourteenth Amendment,111 held 
this to be a political question within the exclusive 
authority of the Congress. Finally, petitioners a~gued that 
Kansas had not ratified the amendment within a reasonable 
time after it was submftted to the states. The court 
reaffirmed Dillon v. Gloss, supra, 256 U.S.' 368, where it 
said that an amendment must be ratified within a reasonable 
time, but held that the timeliness of a particular ratifi-
cation was also a political question entrusted to the 
Congress. Four concurring justices went further, asserting 
that "The [amending] process itself 1s 'political' in its 
entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of 
111 On July 20, 1868, the Secretary of State 
notified the Congress that three-fourths of the states had 
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment but that two states, Ohio 
and New Jersey, had subsequently rescinded their ratifica-
tion. Congress was also aware that three southern states 
had initially refused to ratify until new state governments 
were created under congressional reconstruction programs. 
Congress nevertheless declared the Fourteenth Amendment duly 
ratified and a part of the Constitution. 
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the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, 
control or interference at any point." (307 U.S. 433, 459, 
conc. opn. of Black, J.) 
The political question doctrine has undergone 
considerable change since Coleman v. Miller. (See Powell v. 
McCormack (1969) 395 U.S. 486; Baker v. Carr (1962) 369 U.S. 
186.) Judges and commentators have questioned whether 
Coleman v. Miller is consistent with the criteria estab-
lished in these later cases. (See State of Idaho v. Freeman 
(D.ld. 1981) 529 F.Supp. 1107, vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 
809; Dyer v. Blair (N.D. Ill. 1975) 390 F.Supp. 1291, 
1300-1303; Note, Good Intentions, New Inventions, and 
Article V Constitutional Conventions (1979) 58 Tex.L.Rev. 
131, 158-162.> 
But assuming that Coleman v. Miller remains con-
trolling. authority on the issues it decided -- that Congress 
alone has the power to decide whether a ratification sub-
mitted by a state is valid and timely -- that holding does 
not control in the present setting. Hawke v. Smith, No. I 
(1920) 253 U.S. 221 (discussed at length later in this 
opinion (post, pp. ___ - ___ *», is direct authority for the 
proposition that a court can remove a proposal from a state 
election ballot on the ground that it does not conform to 
article V, and by necessary inference that a court has 
* Typed opinIon pages 20-23. 
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authority to adjudicate that question. Contrary to the' 
suggestion of amicus, the majority opinion in Coleman v. 
Miller did not overrule Hawke v. Smith; it cited the earlier 
decision favorably on an issue of standing to sue (307 U.S. 
at pp. 438-449), and never hinted that Hawke v. Smith 
decided a nonjusticiable issue. 
In Oyer v. Blair, supra, 390 r.SUpp. 1291, Judge 
Stevens, now a justice of the United States Supreme Court, 
considered the effect of Coleman v. Miller upon earlier 
Supreme Court article V decisions. The issue in that case 
was whether a state could constitutionally provide that more 
than a simple majority was required to ratify a constitu-
tional amendment. Rejecting the argume~t that every aspect 
of the amending process is a nonjusticiable political, ques-
tion, Judge Stevens stated that "since a majority of the 
Court refused to accept that pOSition in [Coleman v. Miller] 
and since the Court has on several occasions decided ques-
tions arising under Article V, even in the face of 'political 
question' contentions, that argument is not one which a 
District Court is free to accept." (Pp. 1299-1300.> In 
deciding questions of federal constitutional law, a state 
court is equally bound by the controlling Supreme Court 
decisions. 
Judge Stevens went on to consider the question of 
justiciability in light of Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395 
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u . S • 486, .,B a k e r v. Car r, sup r a, :! 6 9 U. S. 1 B 6, and the 
majority opinion in Coleman v. Miller, supra. He distin-
guished Coleman v. Miller; that decision rested on the 
historical precedent of congressional adjudication of the 
effect of withdrawing a ratification. and the difficulty of 
determining what con~tituted a reasonable time for ratifi-
cation. Such precedents and problems, he said, had no 
relevance to the issue 1n Dyer v. Blair -- and, we must add, 
are equally irrelevant to the issue in the present case. 
Judge Stevens observed that "[dlecision of the Question 
presented requires no more than an interpretation-of the 
Constitution. Such a decision falls squarely within the 
traditional role of the ••• judiciary. • •• [,J The 
mere fact that a court has little or nothing but the lan-
guage of the Constitution as a guide to its interpretation 
does no~ mean that the task of construction is judicially 
unmanageable." (Pp. 1301-1302.) He then concluded: "We 
are persuaded that the word 'ratification' as used in 
article V of the federal Constitution must be interpreted 
with the kind of consistency that is characteristic of 
judicial, as opposed to political, decision making." (P. 
1303.) We are similarly persuaded that the word "Legisla-
tures" in article V is subject to judicial construction. 
Concluding, therefore. that the issues here raised 
are justiciable, we turn to the task of construing the lan-
guage of article V. The application clause of that article 
IS 
provides that "[t]he Congress • • • on the Application of 
the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall 
call a Convention for proposing Amendments. " No . . . 
reported decisions have decided whether the term "Legisla-
tures" in this clause includes the reserved powers of 
initiative and referendum.1l1 The term "Legislatures," 
however, also appears in the portion of article V which 
specifies that an amendment becomes "valid to all Intents 
and Purposes ••. when ratified by the Legislatures of 
three-fourths of the several States," and several cases have 
construed the meaning of "Legislatures" in this p~ovision~ 
We turn to examine these decisions. 
Many of the cases, including Barlotti v. Lyons, 
supra, 182 Cal. 575, the only California case, concerned the 
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment prohibiting the 
sale of.alcohol. When the Californi~ Legislature ratified 
III Only two decisions have considered the 
application clause of article V. In Petuskey v. Rampton (D. 
Utah 1969) 307 F.Supp. 235, the district judge ruled that a 
malapportioned state legislature could not apply to Congress 
for a constitutional convention to propose an amendment 
overturning the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions. 
The Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment on the ground that 
only a three-judge court would have jurisdiction to enjoin 
the state from transmitting its application to the Congress. 
(Petusky v. Rampton (1970) 431 F.2d 378, cert. den., 401 
U.S. 913.) The second reported decision, OpInion of the 
Justices to the Senate (Mass. 1977) 366 N.E.2d 1226, held 
that a governor could not veto an application by the 
legislature. 
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the amendment, Barlotti and other petitioners pre~ented a . 
referendum petition to the registrar of voters. The regis-
trar refused to transmit the petition to the Secretary of 
State, and petitioners sought mandamus from this court. Our 
opinion noted two issues: whether the legislative ratifica-
tion was conclusive under the federal Constitution, and 
whether the referendum provisions of the state Constitution 
were intended to apply to resolutions ratifying a constitu-
tional amendment. It addressed only the federal issue, 
finding it decisive of the case. 
Chief Justice Angellotti, for a unanimous court,-
defined the question narrowly, as "being simply one as to 
the meaning of the word 'legislatures' as used in the clause 
'when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the 
several states' of article V •.•• " (P. 577.) "If by 
those words was meant the representative bodies invested 
with t~e law-making power of the several states, which 
existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution 
in each of the several states, and which have ever 
since so existed, as distinguished from the law-making power 
of the respective states, there is nothing left to discuss, 
for with that meaning attributed to the term ••• the 
constItutional provision is so plain and unambiguous as not 
to admit of different constructions. The situation would 
then be that the people of the United States, 1n framing and 
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ratifying. ~he constitution ••• , 'have excluded thems~lvE!s 
from any direct or immediate agency in making amendments to 
it.'n (P. 578.) 
The opinion first examined the ordinary meaning of 
the term. "It certainly is not in consonance with the 
ordinary acceptation of the term 'legislature' to take it as 
meaning otherwise than a representative body selected by the 
people of a state and invested with the power of law-making 
for the state, whatever be the power reserved to the people 
themselves to review the action of that body or to initiate 
and adopt laws." (P. 578.) It then examined the California 
Constitution, in which the word "legislature" appears fre-
quently, always with the plain meaning of the Senate and 
Assembly. Even former a%ticle IV, section 1, which reserved 
the right of initiative and referendum, referred to the 
Senate and Assembly as "The Legislature of the State of 
California." The opinion reviewed the use of the term in 
the United States Constitution, observing that in almost all 
cases it clearly referred to a representative body. Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the term "legislatures" in 
article V means "some official body of a state as distin-
guished from the state itself or the people of the state or 
the whole law-making power of the state." (P. 582.) 
Chief Justice Angellotti recognized the argument 
that direct popular vote is a superior method of ascertaining 
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the popul~r will. He replied that the argument "is, in the 
final analysis, based more upon some present day conceptions 
of what the law in this regard ought to be, than upon the 
_intention of the framers of the constitution as expressed 
therein, and, to our mind, expressed so clearly as to 
preclude any other conclusion than the one we have 
reached." (P. 584.) The court accordingly dismissed the 
petition for mandamus, thereby precluding a referendum 
election on the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment. 
The courts of Maine and Michigan filed opinions 
agreeing with Barlotti that article V precludes a-refereMdum 
on the ratification of a constitutional amendment (Opinion 
of the Justices (1919) lIe Me .. 544; Decher v.· Secretary of 
State (1920) 209 Mich. 565), while Arkansas, Colorado, and 
Oregon reached the same result on state constitutional 
grounds:{Whittemore v. Terral (1919) 140 Ark. 493; Prior v. 
Noland (1920) 68 Colo. 263; Herbring v. Brown (1919) 92 Ore. 
176.) Ohio and Washington, however, upheld referendum 
elections. {Hawke v. Smith (1919) 100 Ohio st. 385; Mullen 
v. Howell (Wash. 1919) 181 Pac. 920.) The Uhited States 
Supreme Court selected the Ohio decision for review and, 1n 
a unanimous decision, held unconstitutional a provision of 
the Ohio Constitution which declared that legislative 
ratification of a federal constitutional amendment was 
incomplete until approved by popular referendum. (Hawke v. 
Smith, supra, 253 U.S. 221.) 
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~he opinion by Justice Day follo~s the same 
reasoning as that of our court in Barlotti. He first 
observes that "Both methods of ratification, by legislatures 
or conventions, call for action by deliberative assemblages 
representative of the people, _hich it -as assumed would 
voice the _ill of the people. • [,] The framers of the 
Constitution might have adopted a different method. Rati-
fication might have been left to a vote of the pe~ple •••• 
[However, the] language of the article is plain, and admits 
of no doubt in its interpretation. It is not the function 
of courts or legislative bodies, national or stat~, to alter 
the method which the Constitution has fixed"," (Pp. 226-227.) 
According to Justice Day, "The only q~estion really 
for determination Is: What did the framers of the "Constitu-
tion mean in reQuiring ratification by 'Leaislatures'? That 
was not ~ term of uncertain meaning when incorporated into 
the Constitution. What it meant when adopted It still means 
for the purpose of interpretation. A Legislature was then 
the representative body which made the laws of the people. 
The term Is often used in the Constitution with this evident 
meaning. Article If § 2, prescribes the Qualifications of 
electors of congressmen as those 'reQuisite for electors of 
the most numerous branch of the state legislature.' Article 
I, § 3, provided that senators shall be chosen 1n each State 
by the legislature thereof, and this was the method of 
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choosing senators until the adoption of the Seventeenth' 
Amendment which made provision for the election of senators 
by vote of the people, the electors to have the qualifica-
tions requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of 
the state legislature. That Congress and the States 
understood that this election by the people was entirely 
distinct from legislative action is shown by the provision 
of the amendment giving the legislature of any State the 
power to authorize the Executive to make temporary appoint-
ments until the people shall fill the vacancies by election. 
It was never suggested, so fai as we are aware, that the 
purpose of making the office of Senator elective by the 
people could be accomplished by a referendum vote. The 
necessity of the amendment to accomplish the purpose of 
popular election is shown in the adoption of the amendment. 
In Article IV the United States is required to protect every 
State against domestic violence upon application of the 
legislature, or of the Executive when the legislature cannot 
be convened. Article VI requires the members of the several 
legislatures to be bound by oath, or affirmation, to support 
the Constitution of the United States. By Article I, § 8, 
Congress is given exclusive jurisdiction over all places 
purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in 
which the same shall be. Article IV, § 3, provides that no 
new States shall be carved out of old States without the 
consent of the legislatures of the States concerned." 
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"There can be no question that the framers of'the 
Constitution clearly understood and carefully used the terms 
in which that instrument referred to the action of the 
legislatures of the states. When they intended that direct 
action by the people should be had they were no less 
accurate in the use of apt phraseology to carry out such 
purpose. The members of the House of Representatives were 
required to be chosen by the people of the several States. 
Article I, § 2." {Pp. 227_228.)1~/ 
Ohio argued that the term "Legislatures" in article 
V referred to the legislative power of the state,' however 
divided between representative assemblies and the people. 
Justice Oay responded that the argument was fallacious, be-
cause "ratification by a State of a constitutional amendment 
1s not an act of legislation within the proper sense of the 
word •• ~ •• [,J The act of ratification by the State derives 
its authority from the Federal Constitution to which the 
14/ Article I, section 4 provides that the manner 
of electing senators and representatives "in each State 
shall be determined by the respective legislatures thereof, 
but that Congress may ••• alter such regulationsi ••• " 
Davis v. Hildebrant (1916) 241 U.S. 565, held that Ohio 
could submit a redistricting proposal to referendum. Hawke 
v. Smith distinguished that case on the ground that con-
gressional legislation, enacted pursuant to this article, 
had granted each state the right to fix congressional dis-
tricts 1n the manner provided by the laws thereof, language 
chosen for the purpose of permitting the initiative and 
referendum. (See 253 U.S. at pp. 230-231.) 
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State and its people have alike assented." (Pp. 229-230.) 
The court accordingly reversed the judgment requiring the 
submission of the ratification to popular referendum. 
Many years have passed since Barlotti and Hawke 
were filed, but those decisions remain the unquestioned and 
controlling authority. (See Opinion of the Justices to the 
Senate, supra, 366 N.E.2d 1226.) Thus in 1975, when the 
California Attorney General was asked whether the voters by 
initiative could rescind the Legislature's ratification of 
the Equal Rights Amendment, he cited Barlotti and Hawke, and 
replied: "The California electorate cannot effectively 
rescind the Legislature's ratification by the initiative 
process because amendments to the federal constitution are 
~ot. subject to the initiative or referendum process in 
California." (58 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. (1975) 830, 831.> 
: As we noted earlier, the cited cases refer to the 
role of the Legislature in ratifying, not in proposing, 
constitutional amendments. Courts and commentators agree, 
however, that the term "Legislatures" bears the same meaning 
throughout article V. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court, in holding that a governor cannot veto an application 
for a constitutional convention, declared that "[s]ince the 
word 'Legislatures' in the ratification clause of Art. V 
does not mean the whole legislative process of the State 
••• , we are of the opinion that the word 'Legislatures' 
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in the ap'plication clause, likewise, does not mean the whole 
legislative process. n (Opinion of the Justices, supra, 366 
N.E.2d 1226, 1228.) Senator Ervin, explaining proposed 
legislation to regulate a constitutional convention, stated 
that n[c]ertainly the term 'legislature' should have the same 
meaning in both the application clause and the ratification 
clause of Article V." (Ervin, Proposed legislation to 
Implement the Convention Method of Amending the Constitution 
(1968) 66 Mich.l.Rev. 875, 889; see Bonfield, Proposing 
Constitutional Amendments by Convention (1969) 39 N.D.l.Rev. 
659, 665.) 
We conclude that when article V refers to an 
application by the nlegislatures"" of two-thirds of the 
states, calling for a constitutional convention, it refers 
to the representative lawmaking bodies in those states. Any 
application directly by the people, through their reserved 
legislative power, would not conform to article V. 
Section 3 of the Balanced Budget Initiative states 
that the people adopt a resolution calling for a constitu-
tional convention, and provides that, if the legislature 
fails to adopt the resolution within 40 legislative days, 
the Secretary of State shall transmit the resolution so 
adopted to the Congress. Under the decisions previously 
discussed, it seems clear that a resolution adopted directly 
by the people and transmitted to Congress without action by 
the legislature would be invalid under article V. 
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The initiative, however, proposes direct action, 
bypassing the Legislature, only as a last resort. The 
thrust of the measure is in the provision mandating the 
Legislature to adopt a resolution applying for a constitu-
tional convention. The question thus arises whether pro 
forma action by a state legislature, acting under compulsion 
of an initiative measure, is sufficient to comply with 
article v. 
The question itself is one of first impression, but 
a number of decisions offer guidance. The ratification of 
the Nineteenth Amendment, giving women the right to vote,-was 
challenged on the ground that two state legislatures ratified 
in violation of state ctinstltutional provisions restricting 
their freedom of action. The Missouri Constitution provided 
that the state legislature could not assent to any amendment 
that wo~ld impair the right to local self-government; the 
Tennessee Constitution provided that the legislature could 
not act upon any amendment until an election intervened. 
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that 
"[t]he function of a state legislature in ratifying a 
proposed amendment to the rederal Constitution • • • is a 
federal function derived from the Federal Constitution; and 
it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the 
people of a state." (Leser v~ Garnett (1922) 258 U.S. 130, 
137; see also Trombetta v. Florida (M.D. Fla. 1973) 353 
28 
F.Supp. 575; Walker v. Dunn (Tenn. 1972) 498 S.W.2d 102~) 
If a state cannot constitutionally prohibit its legislature 
from proposing or ratifying a constitutional amendment, by 
implication it cannot compel the legislature to do so. 
Two other cases involve advisory initiatives. In 
1928 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was asked to 
rule upon a proposed initiative requesting the state's 
congressional delegation to support repeal of the Eighteenth 
Amendment. The court held that the measure was not a proper 
initiative on both state and federal grounds, stating, in-
connection with the latter ground, that "[t]he voters of the 
several St~tes are excluded by the terms of art. 5 of the 
Constitution of the United States from participation in the 
~rocess of its amehdment." (Opinion of the Justices (1928) 
262 Mass. 603, 606.) 
~ Fifty years later the Nevada Supreme Court con-
sidered an initiative advising the state legislature whether 
to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. The court distin-
guished Hawke v. Smith, supra, 253 U.S. 221, and Leser v. 
Garnett, supra, 258 U.S. 130 on the ground that the proposal 
"does not concern a binding referendum, nor does it impose a 
limitation upon the legislature. • •• [T]he legislature 
may vote for or against ratification, or refrain from voting 
on ratification at all, without regard to the advisory vote." 
(Kimble v. Swackhamer (Nev. 1978) 584 P.2d 161, 162.) 
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When opponents of the Nevada initiative sough~ a 
stay from the United States Supreme Court, Justice Renhquist, 
sitting as circuit justice, denied the stay with the follow-
ing order: "Appellant's ••• contention ••• is in my 
opinion not substantial because of the nonbinding character 
of the referendum. • • • Under the circumstances ••• 
reliance [on] ••• Leser v. Garnett ••• and Hawke v. 
Smith .•• is obviously misplaced. • •• I can see no 
constitutional obstacle to a nonbinding advisory referendum 
of this sort." (Kimble v. Swackhamer (1978) 439 U.S. 1385, 
1387.) 
The Massachussetts and Nevada cases squarely dis-
agree on the validity· of a nonbinding initiative, but both 
cases (and especially Justice Rehnquist's order) clearly 
imply that a binding initiative would offend article V. 
Real party in interest, however, cites a decision with 
contrary implications, In re Opinion of the Justices (Ala. 
1933) 148 So. 107. The Alabama Supreme Court was asked to 
rule on a proposed statute requiring that delegates to a 
convention to ratify the Twenty-first Amendment pledge to 
follow the result of a statewide vote. Quoting Hawke v. 
Smith, supra, 253 U.S. 221, 226-227, where the court said 
the framers of the Constitution "assumed" that legislatures 
and conventions "would voice the will of the people," the 
Alabama court reasoned that the function of deliberative 
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: 
bodies in ratifying proposed amendments was merely to . 
ascertaiA and carry out the popular will. A direct and 
binding instruction to the delegates, it concluded, would 
more truly and efficiently fulfill that function.111 
We question whether the reasoning of the Alabama 
court applies to the act of a legislature in proposing or 
ratifying an amendment. The analysis of the federal 
Constitution set out in Barlotti and Hawke indicates that 
the drafters of that document deliberately chose to vest the 
pow~r of proposal and ratification in state legislatures 
instead of the people. The framers were, of courJe, awa~e 
of the difference between a representative body and the 
electorate as a whole;, they knew that a legislature is a 
deliberative boqy, empowered to conduct hearings, examine 
evidence, and debate propositions. Its members may be 
assume~ generally to hold views reflecting the popular will, 
but no one expects legislators to agree with their consti-
tuents on every measure coming before that body. Yet, 
although undoubtedly aware that the views of a deliberative 
body concerning a proposed amendment might depart from those 
.!.2/ Real party in interest also cites In re 
Opinions of the Justices (N.C. 1933) 204 N.C. 806. That 
decision upheld the validity of a proposed bill which would 
have allowed the voters to decide whether to call a state 
convention to consider ratification of the Twenty-first 
Amendment. It does not appear that the delegates to such a 
convention, if called, were required to vote one way or the 
other on the ratification. 
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of a majority of the voters, the framers of the Constitution 
. 
chose to give the voters no direct role in the amending 
process; legislatures alone received the power to apply for 
a national convention, and legislatures or conventions, as 
Congress chose, the power to ratify amendments.121 
The only conclusion we can draw from this fact is 
that the drafters wanted the amending process in the hands 
of a body with the power to deliberate upon a proposed 
amendment and, after considering not only the views of the 
people but the merits of the proposition, to render a 
considered judgment. A rubber stamp legislature could no~ 
fulfill its function under article V of the Constitution. 
We conclude that a state may not, by initiative or 
otherwise, compel its legislators to apply for a constitu-
tional convention, or to refrain from such action. Under 
article .V, the legislators must be free to vote their own 
considered judgment, being responsible to their constituents 
through the electoral process. The proposed Balanced Budget 
Initiative, to the extent that it mandates the California 
121 It has been argued that the framers of the 
Constitution considered state conventions to be more repre-
sentative than state legislatures, and for that reason 
directed that the ratification of the original Constitution 
be by conventions. (See discussion in United States v. 
Sprague (1931) 282 U.S. 716, 731.) If so, it is significant 
that the wording of article V permits Congress to choose 
between ratification by the more representative convention 
or the less representative legislature, but permits only the 
legislature to apply for a national convention. 
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Legislature to apply to CongTess for a constitutional conven-
. . 
tion, violates article V of the United States Constitution. 
The resolution set out in section I of the initia-
tive includes language which merely petitions Congress to 
adopt a balanced budget amendment, and does not attempt to 
invoke the application process of article V. Since that 
language does not purpoTt to bind Congress or the state 
Legislature to undertake any act of legal significance under 
article V, it is analogous to the advisory initiatives 
discussed earlier in this opinion. (~, pp. ___ -___ .*) 
As we there noted, the decisions conflict, with one case 
(Opinion of the Justice, supra, 262 Mass. 603) ruling that 
an advisory initi-ative violates article V, but a later 
decision (Kimble v. Swackhamer, supra, 584 P.2d 616) 
upholding such an initiative. 
~ A Tesolution, whether by the Legislature or by the 
people, urging Congress to approve a proposed constitutional 
amendment is not an act of constitutional significance. Such 
a resolution does not call for a national convention, pro-
pose an amendment, or ratify an amendment. We therefore 
conclude, in accord with Kimble v. Swackhamer, that such a 
resolution does not raise any issue under the federal 
Constitution. It follows that the Balanced Budget 
• Typed opinion pages 29-30. 
Initiative, insofar as it merely adopts a resolution urging 
Congress to submit a constitutional amendment to the states, . 
and mandates the Legislature to adopt that resolution, does 
not offend article V. 
Our conclusion that the crucial provisions of the 
initiative measure are invalid under the United States 
Constitution, but that other, subordinate provisions are 
not, necessarily raises a question of severability. Since 
the same question arises in connection with our analysis of 
the state constitutional issues, we defer discussion of the 
matter until later in this opinion. 
III. Issues Arising Under the California 
Constitution 
The Balanced Budget Initiative contains three 
substantive sections. At the core of the initiative is the 
resolution set out in section 1, which calls upon Congress 
to submit a balanced budget amendment, and applies to Con-
gress for a constitutional convention to propose such an 
amendment. Section 1 then mandates the Legislature to adopt 
this resolution. Section 2 provides that if the Legislature 
does not comply within 20 legislative days, the legislators' 
compensation is suspended. Section 3 provides for adoption 
of the resolution by the people, and directs the Secretary 
of state to transmit it to Congress if the Legislature fails 
to adopt it within 40 legislative days. 
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Article IV, section 1 of the California Constitution 
declares that "[t]he legislative power of this state is 
vested in the California Legislature which consists of the 
Senate and Assembly, but the People reserve to themselves 
the powers of initiative and referendum." Article II, 
section 8, subdivision (a) defines the initiative: "The 
initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes 
and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject 
them." (Italics added.)ll/ Article II, section 9 defines 
the referendum in similar terms; it is "the power of the 
electors to approve or reject statutes." (Italics added.) 
Prior to the 1966 revision of the California 
Constitution, the. relevant provision (then part of art. IV, 
§ 1) reserved to the people the power to propose "laws" (the· 
initiative) or to reject any "acts" passed by the Legislature 
(the ref.erendum). The California Constitution Revision 
Commission selected the term "statutes" as a simpler state-
ment of the reserved power, without a change in meaning. 
(Cal. Canst. Revision Com., Proposed Revision Canst. (1966) 
p. 43.) The 1966 revision also amended article IV, section 
15 (now art. IV, § 8, subd. (b», which had declared in part 
that "No law shall be passed except by bill"i the new 
11/ The phrase "amendments to the Constitution" 
in Article II refers to amendments to the state Constitution, 
and has no application to the present case. 
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version reads "The Legislature may make no law except by 
statute and may enact no statute except by bill. nlBI 
The question we face is whether the Balanced Budget 
Initiative proposes to adopt a "statute" within the meaning 
of article II of the CalifOrnia Constitution. In resolving 
this question, we must bear in mind the declared "duty of 
the courts to jealously guard" the people's right of initia-
tive and referendum. (Martin v. Smith (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 
115, 117; Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of 
Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591.) "[I]t has long been 
our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this 
power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be 
not improperly annulled." (Mervynne v. Acker, supra, 1B9 
Ca1.App.2d 558, 563; Gayle v. Hamm, supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 
250, 258; Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of 
Livermor~, supra, 18 Cal.3d 582, 591; see Amador Valley 
Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization 
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 219; San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. 
v. City Council (1974) 13 Cal.3d 205, 210, fn. 3, app. dism. 
427 U.S. 901.) 
~I Before the 1966 revision the California 
Constitution also provided for the "indirect initiative." 
(See former art. IV, § 1, , 4.) The voters could propose a 
bill to the Legislature, 1f the Legislature failed to enact 
that bill within 40 days, the matter was resubmitted to the 
voters for approval or rejection at the next general 
election. The 1966 Report of the California Constitution 
Revision Commission recommended deleting this provision, 
noting that it added an unnecessary step in the initiative 
process, and as a result was seldom used. (P. 52.) 
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Even under the most liberal interpretation, however, 
the reserved powers of initiative and referendum do not en-
compass all possible actions of a legislative body. Those 
powers are limited, under article II, to the adoption or 
rejection of "statutes." As we shall explain, it does not 
include a resolution which merely expresses the wishes of 
the enacting body, whether that expression is purely preca-
tory or serves as one step in a process which may lead to a 
federal constitutional amendment. 
A statute declares law; if enacted by the Legisla-
ture it must be initiated by a bill (Cal. Const., .art. IV, 
§ 8), passed with certain formalities (1£.), and presented 
to the Governor for signature (art. IV, § 10). Resolutions 
serve, among other purposes, to express the views of the 
resolving body. (See Mason, Legislative Bill Drafting (1926) 
14 Cal.L.Rev. 379, 389-391.) A resolution does not require 
the same formality of enactment, and is not presented to the 
Governor for approval.!!/ 
12/ In one California case, Mullan v. state 
(1896) 114 Cal. 578, the distinction between a statute and a 
resolution proved a trap for the litigant. The Legislature, 
on request of the Governor, had passed a joint resolution 
authorizing Captain Mullan to negotiate with the federal 
government for reimbursement of state expenses and claims 
arising out of the Moduc Indian War. The resolution pro-
vided for payment to Captain Mullan of 20 percent of the 
amount collected, and when payment was not made, Mullen 
filed suit. Citing article IV, section 15, which then 
provided that "No law shall be passed except by bill,· the 
(fn. continued) 
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"It is frequently said that the distinction between 
bills an~ resolutions is that resolutions are not law. As a 
generalization this is probably accurate, if by 'law' is 
meant those legislative actions which operate on all persons 
in society, and must be enforced by the executive department, 
and sustained by the Judiciary." (IA Sutherland, Statutory 
Construction (Sands rev. ed. 1972) p. 335.) The writer adds 
that "In Congress and some of the states joint resolu-
tions enacted with all the formalities of bills operate as 
law" (id.), but states in a footnote that in most states, 
including California, "specific constitutional p~ovisions 
prevent a resolution from being treated as a law." (P. 336, 
fn. 4.)2?1 
(fn. 19 continued) 
court denied his claim. "A mere resolution," it said, "is 
not a campetent method of expressing the legislative will, 
where that expression is to have the force of law, and bind 
others than the members of the house or houses adopting it. 
The fact that it may have been intended to subserve such 
purpose can make no difference. . •• 'Nothing becomes law 
simply and solely because men, who possess the legislative 
power will that it shall be, unless they express their 
determination to that effect in the mode appointed by the 
instrument which invests them with power, and under all the 
forms which that instrument has rendered essential.'" 
(Pp. 584-585.) 
£QI Two opinions of the California Attorney 
General comment on this matter. In 1943, the Assembly re-
solved that a government department should undertake a study 
of the Los Angeles Airport; the department inquired whether 
it could use certain funds for that purpose. The Attorney 
General replied WA resolution of a single house of the Legis-
lature, or for that matter, a concurrent resolution, does 
(fn. continued) 
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In Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond (191~) 
170 Cal. &'05, the court applied this distinction to a 
municipal referendum. It first declared that the referendum 
under state law applied only to "acts which must be passed 
in the form of a statute" (po 609), as distinguished from a 
joint resolution, and construed the Richmond City Charter to 
conform to state practice. This language would seem to 
foreshadow the invalidity of the referendum, but the court 
then looked more closely ~t the resolution in question. The 
city council had resolved to accept a gift of land and 
money, but that gift was conditioned upon the city using the 
money (and additional city funds) to build a new city hall 
on the site donated .. Viewing this resolution as the 
equivalent of an ordinance fixing the site of the city hall 
and appropriating money for its construction -- an exercise 
of legisfative power -- the court held the resolution 
subject to referendum. (See pp. 613-615.) In other words, 
it is the substance, not the label, that controls, and if a 
"resolution" does enact a law, it is subject to referendum. 
(fn. 20 continued) 
not have the force and effect of law. • •• [An appropria-
tion] can only be accomplished by a regular statute •••• " 
(1 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 438, 439.) Three years later the 
Attorney General repeated: "The Constitution, with certain 
exceptions, provides that no law shall be passed except by 
bill. [Citation.) A resolution merely expresses the views 
of both branches of the legislature." (7 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 
381, 382.) 
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The decisions of other states, involving the' . 
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment discussed earlier 
in this opinion (~, pp. 19-22), addressed the specific 
question whether a resolution ratifying a constitutional 
amendment falls within the reserved power of initiative and 
referendum. (Barlotti v. Lyons, supra, 182 Cal. 575, the 
California decision concerning the Eighteenth Amendment, 
noted but did not decide the question whether a resolution 
ratifying a c~nstitutional amendment was within the reserved 
power of referendum.) The majority of deCisions, construing 
state constitutional provisions indistinguishabl~ from the 
California provision, have concluded that such a resolution 
is "not subject to popular vote. 
Whittemore v. Te.rral, supra, 140 Ark. 493, held 
that the word "acts" in the Arkansas Constitution (the same 
word as:in the pre-1966 Cal. Const.) "means an enacted law 
-- a statute." (Pp. 497-498.) The ratification of a pro-
posed constitutional amendment, the court said, is but a 
step in the enactment of a law; it does not in itself enact 
a law and 1s thus not subject to referendum. (P. 499.) 
The court also construed the word "acts" in Prior 
v. Noland, supra, 68 Colo. 263. "It is only in the sense of 
a law, a statute, that the term 'act' is used in the initia-
tive and referendum." (Po 267.) Noting that the term is 
used 1n connection with "bill" -- as it also was in the 
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pre-1966 Ca Ii forni,3 provisions -- the court stated that "A 
resolution Is not a bill. [Citation.] The distinctions 
between a bill and a resolution are well defined •••• 
'The concurrent resolution ••• cannot be held to be a law 
of the state.'" (1£.) 
In Decher v. Secretary of State, supra, 209 Mich. 
565, the court concluded that "the framers of the [Michigan] 
Constitution, by the use of the word "act" .•. had in mind 
a statute or law passed with the formality required by the 
Constitution and approved by the governor." (Pp. 576-577.) 
The act of the state legislature in ratifying a federal 
constitutional amendment "is not the making of a law or an 
'act' as understood in legislative pa;lance."(P. 577.) 
The Maine Supreme Court likewise declared that the 
resolution ratifying the Eighteenth Amendment was not 
subject .to referendum because it "was neither a public act, 
a private act nor a resolve having the force of law. It was 
in no sense legislation." (Opinion of the Justices, supra, 
118 Me. 544, 550.) Finally, the Oregon Supreme Court, In 
Herbring v. Brown, supra, 92 Ore. 176, concluded that "these 
sections [establishing the initiative and referendum] apply 
only to proposed laws, and not to legislative resolutions, 
memorials, and the like." (P. 180.)211 
111 The only contrary decision came from the 
Washington Supreme Court. (Mullen v. Howell. supra, 187 
Pac. 920.) That court reasoned that the argument that the 
(fn. continued) 
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Eight years after the Eighteenth Amendment took 
effect, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered 
whether an initiative requesting the state's congressional 
delegation to support repeal of that amendment constituted a 
"proposed law" within the state's initiative power. "The 
word 'law' ," the justices advised, "imports a general rule 
of conduct with appropriate means for its enforcement 
declared by some authority possessing sovereign power over 
the subject; it implies command and not entreaty; it is 
something different from an ineffectual expression of 
opinion possessing no sanction to compel observan~e of the 
views announced. The text of the proposed law accompanying 
this inltiati¥e petition does not prescribe a general rule 
of conduct. It merely invites a declaration of opinion by 
voters on a subject over which the people of the Common-
wealth possess no part of the sovereign power." (262 Mass. 
(fn. 21 continued) 
legislature ratified the amendment by resolution and that B 
resolution was not subject to referendum was self-defeating 
because under the state constitution the legislature had no 
power to act except by bill. (This argument assumes that a 
state legislature's power to ratify a federal constitutional 
amendment derives from the state constitution and is subject 
to limitations in the document; Leser v. Garnett, supra, 258 
U.S. 130, held to the contrary.) The Washington court 
further reasoned that it was not the resolution, but the act 
of the legislature in adopting 1t, that was subject to 
referendum. 
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at p. 605.) The court concluded that the proposal was not 
within the reserved initiative power.~1 
Thus as of the 1920's, the majority view was that 
under constitutional provisions such as that in California, 
the reserved power of initiative and referendum was limited 
to such measures as constituted the exercise of legislative 
power to create binding law -- the kind of measure that 
would be introduced by bill, duly passed by both houses of 
the legislature, and presented to the governor for 
signature. That reserved power did not extend to the 
ratification of constitutional amendments, since.a state in 
ratifying an amendment was not asserting legislative power 
under its own constitution, but exercising a power delegated 
to the state legislatures by article V of the federal 
Constitution. (See Leser v. Garnett, supra, 258 U.S. 130, 
137.) Neither did that power extend to resolutions which 
~ 
merely declared policy or entreated action, since such 
1£1 The opinion also noted that "[t]he mandate 
to the Secretary of the Commonwealth ••• to 'transmit 
copies • • • to each senator and representative in congress 
from this commonwealth' is subsidiary and incidental to the 
main purpose of the proposed law; it relates to a matter 
which standing alone possesses no legal force; it cannot 
convert into a law something in itself ineffectual." (262 
Mass. at p. 606.) 
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enactments did not constitut~ the exercise of legislative . 
power to ~reate statutory law.£11 
Real party in interest, however, contends that 
current California practice and decisions permit an initia-
-
tive which merely declares public policy. He points to 
Proposition 12 at the 1982 General Election, which endorsed 
a bilateral freeze on the construction of nuclear weapons 
and required the Governor to transmit that endorsement to 
the President and other federal officials. No judicial 
decision discussed the validity of the Nuclear Freeze 
Initiative, but real party suggests that policy initiative 
was justified by two earlier decisions, Farley v. Healey 
III The issue 1n this guise the distinction 
between a statute (or an "act," a "law," or a "bill") and a 
resolution has not arisen since that date. Subsequent cases 
have concerned the question whether a measure was "legisla-
t i ve ," ":a d min i s t rat i ve ," 0 r " a d j u d i cat i ve • " ( See, e. g • , 
Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa (1980) 28 Cal.3d 
511; Housing Authority v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 
550; Simpson v. Hite, supra, 36 Cal.2d 125; Fishman v. City 
of Palo Alto, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d 506; O'Loane v. O'Rourke 
(1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 774; Mervynne v. Acker, su~ra, 189 
Cal.App.2d 558.) These cases assert generally t at legis-
lative acts "are those which declare a public purpose and 
make provisions for the ways and means of its accomplish-
ment." (Fishman v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d 
506, 509; accord, O'Loane v. O'Rourke, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 
774, 784.) That definition was fashioned to distinguish 
administrative acts, which "carry out the legislative 
policies and purposes already declared by the legislative 
body" (Fishman v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 509). It will serve in the present context, however, 
because a resolution, as distinct from a statute, is essen-
tially an enactment which only declares a public purpose and 
does not establish means to accomplish that purpose. 
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(1967) 67.Cal.2d 325, and Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. 
Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 315. 
farley v. Healey, supra, involved a San francisco 
city initiative which declared city policy favoring an imme-
diate ceasefire in Vietnam and withdrawal of American troops 
from that country. The San Francisco City Charter defined 
the right of initiative with unusual breadth: it included 
the power to adopt "any ordinance, act or other measure which 
is within the power conferred upon the board of supervisors 
to enact," and provided that "[a]ny declaration of policy 
may be submitted to the electors in the manner pr6vided f~r 
the submission of ordinances .••• " (P. 328, Quoting S. F. 
City Charter, § 179.) ConseQuently, the court rejected the 
argument that the initiative was invalid because it did not 
concern a municipal affair. "[B]oards of supervisors and 
city councils have traditionally made declarations of policy 
on matters of concern to the community whether or not they 
had power to effectuate such declarations by binding legis-
lation." (P. 328.) Thus the proposed declaration of policy, 
being within the power of the board of supervisors, could be 
enacted by initiative under the terms of the city charter. 
Two later opinions of the California Attorney 
General indicated that Farley v. Healey did not state legal 
prinCiples applicable to California initiatives generally, 
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but was based on the specific language of the San Francisco 
.' 
Charter. In 1973 the voters in Humboldt County proposed 
to "direct the Board of Supervisors to notify the Congress 
and the President • • • of our desire to see a terminal 
date set for the withdrawal of all United States equipment 
and personnel from South East Asia .• n The Attorney . . 
General, responding to a request from the Humboldt County 
Counsel, advised that "[s]uch a measure is not a proper 
subject for an initiative by the people of a county under 
the [California] Constitution and general laws for county 
government" (56 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 61, 62 (1973» because. 
it did not constitute legislation but instead "requests 
the adoption of an nonlegislative resolution • • . re-
lating to matters outside the purview of the county govern-
ment." (lQ.., at p. 63.) He distinguished Farley v. Healey 
on the ground that under the San Francisco Charter an 
initiative measure did not have to be a legislative act. 
(P. 64.) 
Two years later the Attorney General referred to 
his earlier opinion. In that opinion, he said, "this 
office distinguished the language of the San Francisco 
charter from the definition of 'initiative' in the Cali-
fornia Constitution. [Citation.] In determining that 
local initiatives in general law counties cannot be used 
for policy declarations, inferentially we indicated that 
the statewide initiative 1s not available for such purposes 
either." (58 Ops.Cal.Atty. Gen. 830, 831, fn. 2 (1975).) 
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The second case on which proponents rely is Santa 
Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d 315. 
A state initiative, Proposition 21, repealed Education Code 
sections 5002 and 5003, which directed school districts to 
eliminate racial imbalance, and added section 1009.6 to 
prohibit mandatory busing. In upholding the portion of the 
initiative repealing sections 5002 and 5003, we stated that 
"the people of California through the initiative process 
.•. have the power to declare state policy. The repealing 
provisions of Proposition 21 can conceivably be interpreted 
as an expression by the people of . their pref.erence for 
a 'neighborhood school policy.'" (P. 330.) The specific 
provisions upheld, however, did not declare policy except by 
inference; they simply repealed two specific sections of the 
Education Code. Whatever policies motivated that repeal, it 
is clear:that Proposition 21 took statutory form. 
The cited cases, thus, are consistent with the 
conclusion we drew earlier -- that the function of the 
initiative under the California Constitution is to enact (or 
repeal) statutes. The statute may declare policy as well as 
provide for its implementation. Indeed it is common for 
statutes, including initiative statutes, to contain a sec-
tion which declares policy and provides a guide to the 
implementation of the substantive provisions of the 
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measure.£!1 But an initiative which seeks to do sometning 
other than enact a statute -- which seeks to render an 
administrative decision, adjudicate a dispute, or declare by 
resolution the views of the resolving body -- is not within 
the initiative power reserved by the people. 
We now turn to apply this analysis to the Balanced 
Budget Initiative. Section 1 of the initiative mandates the 
Legislature to adopt a resolution calling upon Congress to 
propose a balanced budget amendment, and applying for a 
constitutional convention to propose such an amendment. 
This section is in form neither a statute nor a r~solution, 
but a cross between the indirect initiative repealed in 1966 
(see fn. 20, ~) and a writ of mandamus. The distinction 
between an initiative which enact~ a statute and one which 
commands the Legislature to do so is a narrow one, but may 
be constitutionally significant. If the people have the 
power to enact a measure by initiative, they should do so 
directly; if the people lack a power entrusted solely to the 
Legislature, they should not be permitted to.circumvent that 
limitation. In any event, section 1 does not mandate the 
241 The distinction between a declaration of 
policy which takes statutory form and one that does not is 
functional as well as formal. In the former case, the 
declaration of policy can be cited and relied upon by admin-
Istr~tors and courts in the interpretation and application 
of other statutory provisions. A declaration which merely 
reQuests action by Congress, and which relates to a matter 
beyond the state's legislative jurisdiction, can have no 
such legal effect. 
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Legislature to enact a statute, but to adopt a resolution. 
That resolution is in part a simple declaration of policy, 
without statutory implementation, and in part a step in a 
federal process which may eventually lead to amendment of 
the federal Constitution. It does not create law and thus, 
under the authorities and analysis we have examined, does 
not "adopt" a "statute" within the meaning of article II of 
the California Constitution. 
Section 2 of the initiative proposes to amend sec-
tions 8901 through 8903 and section 9320 of the Government 
Code relating to the payment of legislators' sala~ies. This 
section takes the form of a statutory enactment and, standing 
alone, could not be cr i tized on t.he; ground that it fails to 
"adopt" a "statute" within the scope of.article ILllI 
~ 111 Section 2 states that if the Legislature 
fails to adopt the prescribed resolution within 20 legisla-
tive days, all payments to legislators shall be suspended 
until the resolution is adopted. Petitioners claim this 
section violates three provisions of the California 
Constitution: (1) article III, section 4, which provide 
that "salaries of elected state officials may not be reduced 
during their term of office"; (2) article IV, section 4, 
which provides that any adjustment in the compensation of 
members of the Legislature "may not apply until the 
commencement of the regular session commencing after the 
next general election following enactment of the statute 
[adjusting the compensation]"; and article IV, section 15, 
which make it a felony to seek to "influence the vote or 
action of a member of the Legislature in the member's 
legislative capacity by bribery, promise of reward, . 
intimidation, or other dishonest means." 
(fn. continued) 
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Section 2~ however, simply provides a sanction, suspension 
of legislators' compensation, which goes into effect only if 
the Legislature fails to comply with section I within 20 
legislative days. Consequently if section 1 is invalid, 
section 2 falls with it; it cannot be severed to Obtain 
independent life. 
Finally, section J, the remaining substantive pro-
vision of the initiative, adopts a resolution calling upon 
Congress to propose a balanced budget amendment, and directs 
the Secretary of State to apply for a constitutional conven-
tion. We previously held that this application is invalid 
under article V of the federal Constitution. (See ante at -
p. 27.) We now observe, In addition, that the'adoption of 
this resolution under section J of the initiative does not 
constitute the adoption of a "statute," and thus does not 
fall wit"hin the scope of the initiative power under article 
II. 
(fn. 25 continued) 
Arguments of this character, which go to the sub-
stance of the initiative instead of the people~s power to 
enact the measure, ordinarily would not justify preelection 
review. Moreover, even if section 2 were found invalid on 
one of these grounds, section 2 is severable in this respect. 
We would still face the question whether the people could 
mandate the Legislature to adopt a resolution calling for a 
constitutional convention, even if the specified means of 
enforcement were improper. We have therefore not attempted 
to analyze in depth or to resolve the substantive issues 
presented concerning the constitutionality of section 2 of 
the initiative. 
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We therefore conclude that the Balanced Budget"Ini-
tiative is invalid as a .hole because it fails to adopt a 
statute, and thus does not fall .ithin the reserved initia-
tive po.er as set out in article II of the California Con-
stitution. We acknowledge the arguments of the proponents 
that there may be value to permitting the people by direct 
vote not only to adopt statutes, but also to adopt resolu-
tions, declare policy, and make known their vie.s upon 
matters of statewide, national, or even international 
concern. Such initiatives, .hile not having the force of 
law, could nevertheless guide the lawmakers in future 
decisions. Indeed it may well be that the declaration of 
broad statements of policy is a"more suitable use for the 
initiative than the enactment of detailed and technical . 
statutes. Under the terms of the California Constitution, 
however,:the initiative does not serve those hortatory ob-
jectives; it functions instead as a reserved legislative 
power, a method of enacting statutory law. The present 
initiative does not conform to that model. 
Even if we could uphold a portion of section 3 on 
the theory that the term "statute" in article II could be 
liberally construed to include a policy resolution, we would 
still be impelled to exclude the initiative from the ballot. 
The most important parts of the initiative, the provisions 
in section 1 mandating legislative action and the part of 
section J applying for 8 constitutional convention, would 
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still ~e invalid. Section 2 would be inoperative, sincie the 
invalidity of the legislative mandate necessarily implies 
the invalidity of a salary suspension intended to coerce 
compliance with that mandate. Under such circumstances, to 
submit the measure to the voters without redrafting would 
confuse the electorate and mislead many voters into casting 
their ballot on the basis of provisions which had already 
been found invalid. As the court explained in People's 
Lobby v. Board of Supervisors (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 869, 
874,261 "to order the proposal to be placed on the ballot 
when only a small part of it could be valid would-be using 
the writ of mandate for the purpose of misleading the 
voters." (See also Alexander v. Mitchell (1953) 119 Cal. 
App.2d 816, 829-830; Bennett v. Drullard (1915) 27 Cal.App. 
180, 186-187.)£11 
l!1 Disapproved on other grounds in Associated 
Home Builders v. City of Livermore, supra, 18 Cal.3d 582, 
596, footnote 14. 
£11 Our decision in Santa BarbaraSch. Dist. v. 
Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d 315, rejected the argument 
that a different test of severability applies to initiative 
measures than to ordinary statutes passed by the Legisla-
ture. (See p. 332, fn. 7.) That case, however, involved 
postelection review of an initiative, and used language 
which left open the test of severability in preelection 
review. (See id.) On this matter, we think the timing does 
make a difference. After the election, no harm ensues if 
the court upholds a mechanically severable provision of an 
initiative, even if most of the provisions of the act are 
invalid. In a preelection opinion, however, it would con-
stitute a deception on the voters for a court to permit a 
measure to remain on the ballot knowing that most of its 
provisions, including those provisions which are most likely 




Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding 
respondents not to take any action, including the expendi-
ture of public funds, to place the proposed Balanced Budget 










AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR v. EU 
S.F. 24746 
CONCURRING OPINION BY !(AUS, J. 
1 agree with the majority that under article V of the 
United States Constitution as interpreted in the applicable 
federal precedents the initiative process cannot be used 
directly to apply for a call of a constitutional convention or 
indirectly to mandate the California Legislature to so apply. 
Because the governing federal law so clearly evisc.erates ~he 
heart of the proposed initiative, I also agree that it is 
appropriat~ to remove the matter from the ballot at this time, 
before additional effort and expense are incurred on an 
inevitably futile task. I do not believe, however, that it is 
necessary to determine whether a small portion of the measure 
-- by which the electorate purports simply to urge Congress to 
propose a balanced budget amendment -- would, standing alone, 
be a proper initiative measure under the California 
Constitution. Although I am not ready to say that it would 
not be, it would surely be permitting the tail to wag the dog 
to find that the possible validity of this minor part of the 
measure justifies the submission of a largely invalid 
initiative to the electorate. {See People's Lobby v. Board of 
1 
Supervisors (1973) 30 Ca1.App.3d 869, 874, disapproved on 
another pOint in Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City 
of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582; Alexander v. Mitchell 





AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND 
CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS et ale 
S.F. 24746 
DISSENTING OPINION BY LUCAS, J. 
1 xespectfully dissent. The majoxity, acting both 
pxecipitously and pxematuxely, has once again depxived the 
sovexeign people of theix pxecious initiative right. 
(See Legislatuxe of the State of Califoxnia v. Deukmejian 
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 658 [blocking vote on reappoxtionment 
initiative].) In my view, the majoxity exrs in at least 
three sepaxate respects, by (1) selecting this case fox 
preelection xeview, contxaxy to .the well-settled xule 
favoxing the initial exercise of the people's franchise, 
(2) misinterpreting the fedexal constitutional pxovision 
(U. S. Const., art. V) pertaining to the calling of a 
constitutional convention "on application oft! the state 
Legislatures, and (3) strictly and narxowly construing the 
scope of the people's xeserved initiative power undex 
CalifoInia law, contxaxy to the rule in dozens of prior 
cases. 
I. Preelection Review 
The dissent of Justice Richardson in the foxegoing 
teappoxtionment initiative case set forth the pextinent 
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autho'!ities which hold that, in the absence of a showing of 
"clea'! invalidity," we should not inte'!fe'!e with a 
scheduled election on an initiative measu'!e but, instead, 
we should defel: ou'! review until afte'! the people have had 
the oppo'!tunity to exp'!ess thei'! views. (Legislatu1:e of 
the State of California v. Oeukmejian, sup'! a , 34 Cal.3d at 
p. 681 [dis. opn.]; see Bl:osnahan v. Eu (1982) 31 Cal.3d 1, 
4.) Even "gtave doubts" '!ega'!ding the validity of an 
initiative do not requil:e p'!eelection teview. (Gayle v. 
Hamm (1972) 25 CaI.App.3d 250, 256.) 
OUt '!ecent pteelection '!eview of the 1983 
reapportionment initiative was "the fi'!st time in 35 years 
this coutt has removed from the ballot a qualified initi- . 
ative meaSUl:e, theteby preventing the people of Califotnia 
ftom ~oting on a subject of g'!eat impo'!tance to them 
•••• " (34 Cal.3d at p. 681 [dis. opn.].) Todayls 
decision, filed less than one yea'! later, reflects in my 
view a distul:bing ttend of this COUl:t to reach out and 
ptematurely decide constitutional issues which might have 
been tendered entirely moot by the results of the forth-
coming election, and which in any event readily could be 
addressed aftet the election has been held. 
What teason does the majotity offet fot breaching, 
once again, the traditional rule of judicial restraint? 
The majority aasetts that "The ptesent proceeding • • • 
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challenges the poweI of the people to adopt the ploposed 
initiative," supposedly a "plopeI SIound" fOI pleelection 
Ieview. (Ante, p. [maj. opn. at p. 1.) SUlely, the - - -
mele "challenge ll to an initiative is not enough to tliggeI 
such expedited, accelelated Ieview, fOI such a challenge 
could be made in evelY case. Instead, we must filst 
satisfy oUlselves that the initiative is cleaIly invalid, 
i.e., cleaIly beyond the people's poweI to adopt. No such 
showing is made hele. 
As I will explain, the people indeed do have the 
poweI to dilect the Legislatule to apply to Congless fOI a 
constitutional convention. But even wete Slave doubts 
plesented IegaIding the initiative's validity, thele ale 
good Ieasons fot defeIling OUI Ieview until afteI the 
people.~ave exptessed theiI views arid voted upon the 
measute. As teal patties hetein point out in one of theit 
btiefs, "Patticipation in the eleetoIal pIoeess and ongoing 
public debate on this impottant issue will benefit the 
citizenty and theit elected teptesentatives. It will allow 
citizens to exetcise theit fitst amenoment tights to 
exptess theit opinions." The majotity's tuling unfottun· 
ately tetminates abluptly any widesplead public debate by 
Califolnia citizens tegaIding a mattet so clueial to theit 
own, and theit nation's, financial well being. Might not 
the Legislatute, the Congtess and the votels each have 
welcomed a public aiting of this impottant lssue1 
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In addition, I question the p~op~iety or necessity 
of· the "rush to judgment" exhibited in this case, resulting 
from the majority's attempt to file its decision before 
impending election deadlines. Most of the briefing in this 
case was completed only a few days prio~ to o~al argument; 
we filed today's opinion only a few days afte~ hea~ing that 
a~gument. How can this cou~t, al~eady swamped with 
hundreds of pending cases, expect to reach a reasoned 
determination of the complex issues presented herein unde~ 
such adverse circumstances1 
Finally, several well· respected amici (former 
Attor.ney General .G~iffin Bell, former Senato~ Sam Irvin, 
and P~ofessor John Noonan) have ~aised an additional 
argument against preelection (o~ indeed any) judicial 
xeviewwhich stxikes me as quite pe~suasive: A couxt, and 
especially a state court, should not pass upon the 
essentially political question regarding the validity of an 
application for a constitutional convention pursuant to 
article V of the fede~al Constitution. (See Coleman v. 
Miller (1939) 307 u.S. 433 [plurality opn., declining 
~eview of validity of state ratification of constitutional 
amendment].) Instead, we should defe~ to Cong~ess, the 
body alone ent~usted by the federal Constitution with the 
xesponsibility to xeceive and review such applications. As 
1 indicate iathe following part of this opinion, it is 
4 
" quite likely that Congyess would conclude that the 
application is, constitutionally valid. What possible haYm 
could yesult fyom OUy defexxing to Congtess xegaxding this 
fedexal question? 
II. Validity Undey Fedexal Law--The Convention Clause 
A%ticle V of the fedeyal Constitution in pextinent 
paxt pxovides that Congxess "on the application of the 
Legislatuxes of two-thixds of the sevexal States, shall 
call a convention fox pxoposing amendments" to the 
Constitution. (Italics added.) Such pxoposed amendments 
"shall be valid ••• when xatified by the Legislatuxes of 
thxee-fouxths of the sevexal States, ox by conventions in 
thxee-fouxths theIeof •••• " Contxaxy to the majoxity 
hexein, the challenged initiative measuye is not in 
confli~t with the foxegoing constitutional pxovision. The 
initiative simply dixects the LegislatuIe to file the 
tequisite application so that Califoxnia may be counted as 
suppoxting the calling of a constitutional convention. 
Whete is the "cleat invalidity" undex fedeIal law in that 
ptocedute'? 
Thus, section one, subdivision (a), of the 
challenged initiative meaSUIe tecites that "The People of 
the State of Califotnia heteby mandate that the Califotnia 
Legislatuxe adopt the following tesolution and submit the 
same to the Congxess •••• n The tesolution which follows 
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urges Congress to p'topose a balanced budget amendment to 
the federal Constitution and makes "application" to 
Congress for the calling ofa constitutional convention to 
consider such an amendment. Assuming that, under 
Califo'tnia law, the initiative process may be used for this 
purpose (a subject I discuss in part III hereof), what 
basis exists fo't holding that the measure contravenes the 
federal constitutional requirements of article V'l That 
a'tticle 'tequires an "application" f'rom the Legislature; the 
challenged measure is designed to provide such an applica-
tion. 
This is not a case wheIe the vote'ts aIe attempting 
to abIogate pIior completed legislative action. (E.g., 
Hawke v. Smith (1920) 253 U.S. 221, 227-230; Batlottiv. 
Lyons .(1920) 182 Cal. 575, 578-584.) In both Hawke and 
Barlotti, the state LegislatuIes had already ratified the 
18th Amendment ("prohibition") by joint resolution. 
Nevertheless, referendum petitions were the'teafter 
c1Iculated for the purpose of submitting the question to 
the voters for their approval or rejection. Both courts 
quite properly held that, under article V of the federal 
Constitution, the term "Legislature" 'tefers only to the 
official representative body or bodies of the various 
states, rathe't than to the legislative power itself, as 
exercised th'tough the referendum. Accordingly, the filing 
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of the joint legislative xesolutions e~hausted the 
xatification process. As stated in Hawke, latification "is 
but the expression of the assent of the state to a proposed 
amendment." (Po 229.) Because article V mandated that 
such assent be expxessed by the "Legislatuxe," the 
xeferendum process was deemed inapplicable and incapable of 
abrogating the priox expxession of legi~lative will. 
In the pxesent case, in contxast to Hawke and 
Barlotti, no attempt is made to "undo" any prior, completed 
legislative act which already had triggered a fedexal 
constitutional process such as calling a convention ox 
xatifying a proposed amendment. Instead, here the initi-
ative process is being used to assuxe that such an act 
finally is undextaken by oux Legislatuxe. Axticle V does 
not PQrpoxt to pxohibit the use of " the initiative process 
as one means of inducing a state legislatuxe to act. 
Indeed, as the foregoing cases make clear, the sole concexn 
of article V is that the tequest for a convention call take 
the form of an application by a state legislature. As 
pxeviously discussed, that concexn is satisfied hexe. 
III. Validity Under California Law--The Initiative Process 
Is an initiative measure which directs the state 
Legislature to apply fox a constitutional convention 
"clearly invalid" undex Califoxnia law? Clearly not. 
Befote confronting that issue, however, we should fixst 
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xeview ceytain fundamental pYinciples which contxol oux 
disposition. Fixst and fotemost, "All political powet 1s 
inhetent in the people. Govetnment is instituted fot theit 
pyotection, secuyity, and benefit, and they have the xight 
to alter or teform it when the public good may tequire." 
(Cal. Const., axt. II, § 1.) A cotollary to this is that 
"the legislative powet of this State is vested in the 
Califoynia Legislature_ • • • , but the people yeserve to 
themselves the powets of initiative and referendum." {M., 
att. IV, § 1, italics added.> Finally, "The initiative is 
the powet of the electors to pIopose statutes and amend-
ments to the Cons.titution and to adopt or '[ej~ct them." 
(g., art. II, § 8, subd. <a>.) 
The majority would apply a na'[row consttuction of 
the scope of the initiative powet under the California 
Constitution. In the majotity's view, directing the 
Legislatute to apply fot a constitutional convention 
involves neithex a "statute" not an "amendment" to the 
state Constitution. But use of such a nayyow construction 
of the people's initiative Yight is directly conttaty to 
the teachings of pxiot decisions of this court which 
tequire a liberal construction favoting the exetcise of the 
initiative povet. 
Justice Tobtinet set foyth the applicable 
ptinciples as follows: "The amendment of the Califotnia 
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Constitution in,19ll to provide for the initiative and 
referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements of 
the progressive movement of the early 1900's. DTafted in 
light of the theory· .that all poveI of gove'Inment ultimately 
resides in the people, the amendment speaks of the initi-
ative and IefeIendum, not as a right gIanted the people, 
but as a power reseIved by them. Declaring it 'the duty of 
the courts to jealously guard this Iight of the people' 
(Martin v. Smith (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 115, 117 [1 Cal. 
Rptr. 307]), the COUlts have described the initi~tive a~d 
refeIendum as articulating 'one of the most precious rights 
or.OU'I democratic process' (Mervynne v. Acke'I [1961] 
189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563 [11 Cal-RptI. 34~]). '[I]t'has 
long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construc-
tion to this power whe'IeVeI it is challenged in order that 
the right be not imp'Ioperly annulled. If doubts can 
reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve 
power, COUltS will preserve it.' (Mervynne v. Acke'I, 
supra, 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563-564; Gayle v. Hamm, supra, 
25 Cal.App.3d 250, 258.)" (Associated Home Bullde'Is etc., 
Inc. v. City of Livermo'te (1976) 18 Ca1.3d 582, 591 
[135 Ca1.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473,92 A.L.R.3d 1038], italics 
added, fns. omitted.) 
Since Associated Home Bul1de'Is, we have often 
followed these admonitions regarding this constitutional 
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~ight. (See, e.g., B~osnahan v. B%own (1982) 32 Cal.3d 
236, 241 [186 Cal.Rptx. 30, 651 P.2d 274] [upholding the 
''Victims' Bill of Rights" initiative]; Fait: Political 
Pxactices Com. v. Supet:iox Couxt (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 41 
[157 Cal.Rptx. 855, 599 P.2d 46] (upholding, in most 
tespects, the Political Refotm Act of 1974]; Amadox Valley 
Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization 
(197"8) 22 Cal.3d 208, 219-220, 248 [149 Cal.Rptx. 239, 
583 P.2d 1281] [upholding the Ja%vis-Gann pxopexty tax 
initiative]; see also Legislatu%e of the State of 
Califo%nia, supxa, 34 Cal.3d 658, 683 [dis. opo.].) 
Unde% a libe%al constxuction of the "pxecious" and 
xese%ved initiative powe%, the people clea%ly -would have 
autho%ity to ditect thei% own xeptesentatives in the state 
Legis\atu~e to apply fot a constitutional convention. Such 
an initiative measu%e teasonably could be deemed a pxoposal 
fot the adoption of a "statute." 
The%e is no fixed, immutable definition of the 
tet:m IIstatute." The te%m could xefet to any foxmal, 
~itten exexcise of legislative powex, whethex ox not 
codified and placed within the Califo%nia codes. The Code 
of Civil P%ocedu%e defines IIstatute" as any '~itten law" 
othex than a constitution. (§ 1897; see also foxmex Cal. 
Const., axt. IV, § 1 [initiative is thepowex to pxopose 
IIlawsU].) The people' s Wt: itten dit:ective to the 
10 
Legislatu%e, mandating it to apply for a constitutional 
convention, certainly would qualify as a written law, i.e., 
a statute. Under this interpretation, we do not need to 
~each the further issue t~oubling the majority. namely, 
whether a legislative resolution applying for a constitu-
tional convention is a statute. The statute involved here 
is the one enacted by the people, directing the Legislature 
to submit that application. 
For example, a recent initiative measuye in pa~t 
tequired the Legislature to adopt ptovisions implementing 
the right of ctime victims to monetaty testitution. 
(Prop. 8, ,adopted at the June 19B2Primary Election, now 
art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) Is not this procedutal mandate 
from the people to the Legislature a ''wtitten law"? If so, 
then ift what tespects does the initiative measuye before us 
fail to qualify as ptoposing such a law? Would it have 
made any diffetence if ouy measure had recited that its 
text would be formally incotporated into a new section of 
the Govetnment Code? Surely such formalism cannot pyevail 
ovet the people's right to be heatd on matte%s of gyave 
impo%tance to them. Indeed, OU% ptior cases requiye us to 
resolve all doubts in favor of the exercise of the 
initiative power, especially where the subject matter of 
the measure is of public interest and concern. {See 
Santa Ba~ba%a School District v. Santa Barbata Supe%ior 
11 
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Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 315, 330 [state initiative measure 
declaring state policy on forced busing]; Farley v. Healey 
(1967) 67 Cal.2d 325. 328-329 [local initiative measure 
adopting policy favoring immediate ceasefl1:e and withdrawal 
from Vietnam].) As stated in the Santa Barbara case, "The 
people of California through the initiative process, have 
the power to declare state policy." (Po 330.) Surely, 
then, they have the power to direct the Legislature, as 
their representatives, to declare such policy on their 
behalf. 
We should bear in mind that, unlike the limited 
referendum power, the initiative is not confined by any 
state constitutional restrictions upon its scope or use. 
(See Cal. Const., art. 11, §§ 8, 9; Carlson v. Cory (1983) 
139 Cal.App.3d 724, 728 [repeal of state inheritance and 
gift taxes].) As Carlson observes, "there is nothing in 
our state Constitution which prohibits the use of the 
statutory initiative to repeal tax law." (P. 731.) 
Similarly, nothing in the state Constitution forbids use of 
the initiative to direct the Legislature to apply for a 
constitutional convention. 
In a case upholding the validity of another 
statewide initiative measure (Prop. 13, adopted June 6, 
1978, now Cal. Const., art. XllLA) , we acknowledged that 
the initiative may be viewed as a "legislative battering 
12 
'" 'C" 
1:am" aimed at: "'t:eay[ing] t:hyough the exaspeyating tangle 
of the txaditional legislative pxoceduye and st1:ik[ing] 
diyectly towaxd the desiyed end.' [Citation.]" (Amadoy 
Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, supya, 22 Cal.3d 208, 228.) Given the 
numeyous xejected oy abandoned bills aimed at accomplishing 
the end sought by the initiative measuye challenged in this 
case, the foxegoing descYiption seems unusually apt. As in 
Amadoy Valley, "Although we expxess neithex appxoval noy 
disappyoval of the [measuye] f1:om the standpoint of sound 
fiscal oy social policy" (p. 229), we should uphold it in 
recognition of the constitutional pIinc.iple that: "All 
political powe1: is inheyent in the people." (Cal. Const., 
art. II, § 1.) Libeyally construed, the initiative powey 
applies heye • . 
IV. Seveyability 
Time constYaints do not pexmit me to explo1:e at 
length the validity of those additional p1:ovisions of the 
challenged initiative which impose financial sanctions upon 
the Legislatu1:e in the event of its noncompliance, and 
which yequiyes the Secyetayy of State to act in lieu of the 
LegislatuYe should it fail to adopt the xes01ution within 
40 days of vote1: appyova1. Suffice it to say that these 
p1:ovisions ale enti1:e1y seveyab1e fYom, and do Dot affect 
the validity of, the p1:ovision di1:ecting the Legislatuye to 
13 
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apply for a constitutional convention. (See In 1:e Blaney 
(1947) 30 Cal.2d 643, 655.) 
Indeed, each sepa1:ate section of the initiative 
meaSU1:e is made "seve1:able" by the te1:ms of the meaSU1:e 
itself, and if any section 01: subdivision is held invalid, 
"the 1:emainder of the initiative • • • shall not be 
affected thereby." 1 see no 1:eason why the initiative may 
not be given effect, at least to the extent it directs the 
Legislature to apply f01: a constitutional convention. The 
distinct and seve1:able questions of prope1: sanctions 01: 
alternative procedures in the event of noncompliance may'be 
decided anothe1: day. 
F01: all the f01:egoing reasons, 1 would deny the 
peremptory writ of 'mandate. 
LUCAS, J. 
14 
.... 1.· '!' 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR-CONGRESS OF IhDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATIONS et a1. v. MARCH FONG EU! as Secretarl: 
i 
of state, etc., et al. (LEWIS K. UHLER, RPI) 
S.F. 24746 




(Secretary of State) 
FOR RESPONDENT: 
(City & County of SF) 
FOR REAL PARTY IN 
INTEREST: 
ALTSHULER & BERZON 
177 Post Street, Suite 600 
San Francisco, CA 
(415) 421-7151 
LAURENCE GOLD, ESQ. 
815 - 16th Street N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
- (202) 637-5390 
ANTHONY MILLER 
Chi~f Deput~ Secretary of State 
1230 J Street 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 445-3671 (8-485-6371) 
THOMAS J. OWEN 
Deputy City Attorney 
206 City Hall 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 558-3282 
JOHN MUELLER 
The Hartford Building 
650 California Street, Suite 2650 
San Francisco, CA 94108 
(415) 989-6800 
